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INEFFICIENCY, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND PRIVATISATION 
Ray REES 
1. Introduction 
There is a general perception, based upon casual observation and some 
systematic empirica! study, that public enterprises are inefllcient.! This paper 
takes this to be true, and is concerned with the problem of providing a 
rigorous analysis and explanation of this inefficiency.2 Privatisation, which, 
in the U.K. at least has received its primary impetus from political and 
ideological motivarions,3 has also been supported by some economists4 
because it is seen as a way of correcting these ine~ciencies. To test this 
argument, the analysis of public enterprise ine~ciency will be extended in 
this paper to the issue of privatisation. 
The analysis is an application of the theory of agency,s and in particular 
makes extensive use of the model of the adverse selection or incentive 
compatability problem. 6 Privatisation is regarded essentially as a change in 
the structure of this principal-agent model. 
Briefly, the adverse selection agency model deals with the situation in 
which an agent is supposed to take decisions on behalf of a principal, but 
has his own objectives which may lead him to act in his own as opposed to 
the principal’s interests. If the principal possessed all the information held by 
the agent, such conflict would not be possible. However, in the adverse 
selection model the agent possesses ome ‘private’ info~ation which is not 
available to the principal. The agent will report a message concerning this 
‘For example, see the papers by Btis, and by P&man and Pestieau, ctsewherc in this volume. 
*It may be useful to distinguish between ‘short-run’ inetliciency, in the sense of wasteful use of 
variable inputs, especially labour. and ‘long-run’ inefficiency, in the sense of ‘great planning 
disasters’, major inefficiencies in investment planning. For interesting discussion of the latter, 
possibly more important type of inefficiency, see Henderson (1977). 
jThc aims of widening the base of share ownership among households, and of ‘rolling back 
the frontiers of the public sector’, as well as the short term political advantage of disguising part 
of government borrowings as the sale of shares in privatised companies have all been relevant 
here. 
*Particularly S.C. Littlechild and M. Beesley. 
sFor general surveys of this theory see MacDonald (1984) and Rees (1985a). 
6A very thorough treatment of this problem in a form directly relevant for the concerns of this 
paper is given in Gucsnerie and LaJTont (1984). See also Caillaud et al. (1985). 
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information, following which decisions are taken and utilities determined, but 
the report may be biased by the self interest of the agent. The problem for 
the principal is then to devise a contract’ which is the best possible given 
that the agent will optimise for himself under whatever contract is specified. 
The main result’ can be very loosely put as follows: the optimal solution for 
the principal is in effect to bribe the agent to report his private information 
truthfully’ by giving him more utility than he would obtain in the situation 
where the principal was fully informed. lo In effect, the agent obtains a rent 
to the monopoly of his private information. 
An approach to explaining public enterprise inefficiency by use of agency 
theory then has to show how a model can be formulated which appears to 
capture the main elements of the real situation and then to show how the 
general nature of the solution to the adverse selection problem implies the 
particular kinds of inefficiency which appear to have been identified. This is 
the task of the following section. 
2. Public enterprise as agency 
The identification of the ‘government’ or ‘planner’ as the principal and the 
enterprise as agent begs a number of questions” but can be justified as a 
fruitful simplification. As a positive proposition, it is certainly not realistic to 
assume that the planner is concerned only with allocative efficiency and, 
possibly, profitability, I2 but if we are concerned with explaining inefficiency 
then again it is useful to model the principal as if he were.13 Main interest 
then centres on the behaviour of the agent, the enterprise, for which a 
positive model has to be constructed. 
The public enterprise is viewed as a coalition of management and workers. 
Management prefers more output to less,14 the workers, or rather their 
union, prefer higher wages and employment levels to lower. Negotiation 
‘This should be loosely intcrpretcd as any set of rules and procedures for regulating the 
agent’s behaviour and determining his pay-off. 
*Full analysis of this result is widely available in the literature. 
this is the so-called ‘revelation principle’. See Mycrson (1979). 
“Or, strictly speaking, for almost all values of the agent’s private information. 
“For example it treats each - government and enterprise - as if it were a single individual 
and linesses the problem of articulation of their preferences. It also ignores the argument hat we 
have a hierarchy, with ‘households’ as the ultimate principal and ‘government’ as a kind of 
intermediate agent. Both these issues deserve further analysis. 
‘*A positive study would have to take a realistic view of the motivations of politicians and 
bureaucrats, in terms perhaps of power, votes, and so on. 
13This permits identification of the loss of efftciency in terms of the sacrifice made by the 
principal to elicit truthful revelation. The drawback to this approach is that it does not permit 
analysis of inelliciencics which may arise because of government objectives which depart from 
allocative eniciency - inefficiency is entirely the fault of the enterprise, as it were. 
“Output seems a useful way to characterize ‘size’, and managers are regarded as would-be 
size maximizers. 
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between them establishes an enterprise utility function which could be 
written as u(y, w,I), where y is total output, w is the wage rate, and 1 is 
employment. is The enterprise faces the usual kind of constraints arising out 
of market demand and supply conditions and technology, with the 
production function given by f(k,I,@, where k is capital and 6 is a 
‘productivity parameter’. It also faces control constraints, which represent he 
process by which government seeks to influence the outcome. In the U.K., 
these take the form essentially of a minimum constraint on profit, rrzx’, and 
a maximum constraint on capital, i6 kl k”. Then, for given values of 6, no 
and k” the enterprise decisions can-be regarded as generated by the 
procedure of maximising its utility” subject to market, technology, and 
control constraints. The details of the results of this maximisation are not of 
immediate interest here,i* though we can note that they imply predictions 
which are consistent with empirical observation of the behaviour of public 
enterprises.lg More to the point, the solution implies an indirect utility 
function v(k”,ao,8), which expresses the enterprise or agent’s maximised 
utility as a function of the control constraint values and the productivity 
parameter, with dv/dkO L_ 0, &$%rO c 0, and &@tI > 0. 
We are now in a position to formulate the agency problem. If the 
principal, the government, possessed full information about market and tech- 
nological conditions, it could instruct the agent to set first-best levels of price, 
output, capital, labour and wage rates. If allocative efficiency were the only con- 
cern this would imply marginal cost pricing, labour receiving its opportunity 
cost wage, and inputs chosen to minimize costs. If profitability also matters, 
we would have a Ramsey pricing rule. However, realistically, government 
does not possess complete information. There is an information asymmetry, 
which here can be modelled by assuming that the enterprise knows its true 
productivity, 0, while the government does not, but possesses only some 
prior probability density on its value. In other words, we have an adverse 
selection type of agency problem. The solution of this problem is perfectly 
standardZo [see Rees (1985,1986a)] and has the following implications. In 
order to induce the enterprise to reveal its true productivity, loosely 
speaking, the government must give it more capital and a lower profit 
constraint than it would in the full information first-best case. Hence, capital 
*‘Any of these variables could also obviously be specified as a vector, or alternatively as an 
index number. 
“?his arises out of the fact that investment is typically subject to rationing procedures. 
“Where the derivatives of the utility function essentially reflect some kind of internal 
bargaining process in the enterprise. Again this aspect of the-model would certainly be worth 
further study. 
*sThey are given in Rees (1984a). 
19.See for example the discussion in Rces (1987a). 
“‘Though an assumption has to be made about the form of the indirect utility function v(-.-,-) 
to guarantee a ‘single-crossing property’. The implication of this assumption for the nature of the 
enterprise utility, demand and production functions is an open question. 
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productivity and overall profitability are lower as a result of the information 
asymmetry. Note that this inefficiency is, by definition of the problem, 
minimised. It is the smallest possible departure from the full information first- 
best consistent with the information asymmetry. 
To summarize, what kind of explanation of public enterprise inefficiency 
does the modelling approach outlined in this section give? It suggests first 
that, relative to any given set of control constraints, wages will be higher 
than competitive levels and employment will be higher than the level that 
minimizes costs at the implied ratio of wages to other input prices. Labour 
productivity will be lower than at a cost minimizing solution. This is 
essentially because the enterprise is a monopoly and so generates rents, some 
of which are captured by the workers who organise themselves and acquire 
bargaining strength for that purpose. The nature of the union’s preferences 
and the structure of the bargaining process imply that capture of these rents 
is done in a way that entails inefftciency - there is a dead-weight loss entailed 
by the process of rent capture.21 
Secondly, it suggests that the slackness of the profit constraint and low 
returns to investment which are taken to be characteristic of public 
enterprise (and which are of course interrelated with the low labour 
productivity, as a formal examination of the model makes clear) are an 
inescapable consequence of information asymmetry - the fact that the public 
enterprise knows its true production possibilities and hence productivities 
and costs, while the government does not. The ineficiency associated with 
this fact - the bribe that has to be paid to induce truthful revelation - can 
only be minimised, and not eliminated. 
Although it does I think give useful insights and ideas, the analysis I have 
just set out is not the full story, essentially because it is not really descriptive 
of the actual control process. In reality, the ‘agency problem’ - the problem 
of incentive compatibility - is not solved. The government in fact allows itself 
to be manipulated by the enterprise and accepts false, or, better, excessively 
optimistic, information about production possibilities. In a paper in which I 
have tried to analyse how the system actually does work [Rees (1984b)J I 
have shown that something called profit consistency plays the key role here, 
and the lack of it in the actual planning process leads inefficiency to be even 
greater than if the agency problem were solved. 
By profit consistency I mean simply that given the value of 0 reported by 
the enterprise, and the capital allocation set, the profit target is the amount 
of profit generated by that amount of capital for that value of 8. In other 
words, the enterprise is required to earn the profit it says it can earn given 
the 8 it has reported and the capital allocated. 
“Of COUBC, exactly the same conclusion would apply if the enterprise were a private 
monopoly. What diITers is the tightness of the profit constraint under private as opposed to 
public enterprise, and the possibility that unions receive political support in their efforts at rent 
capture in the public sector. 
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The solution of the incentive compatibility problem in the agency model is 
certainly profit consistent, and indeed this is a fundamental attribute of it. 
For each 8 reported there is a corresponding pair of values of the 
constraints, (k”(@,no(e)), where a’(0) must be generated from k’(O). In the 
actual process of public enterprise investment planning and control, however, 
this consistency does not usually exist: public enterprises are not constrained 
to earn the returns they say they will earn when they submit their investment 
plans (report 0). The major reason for this is the typically long gestation 
periods of investment and the fact that profit constraints are set for a short 
period ahead in the light of the conditions determining the total profitability 
of the enterprise at the time. Thus suppose an enterprise submits a plan for a 
large capital expenditure on the basis of a forecast of high productivity, high 
demand and a high rate of return, and suppose that this is acce.pted.22 Then, 
after, say, a five year gestation period, the project comes on stream, but with 
lower productivity and demand than predicted. It would not usually happen 
that the enterprise would then be constrained to earn the profit implied by 
its original forecast, even though incentive compatibility requires that it must 
be.23 Thus there are no penalties for over-optimistic forecasting, and this will 
therefore be the result. The absence of profit consistency implies that public 
enterprise inefficiency will be still greater than the inescapable minim,um 
which the analysis of the agency model identifies as stemming from the 
information asymmetry at the root of the problem - we have an additional 
element in the explanation of inefficiency to those suggested by the agency 
model. 
3. Privatisation 
By privatisation I mean the vesting of the assets of a public enterprise in a 
limited liability company and the sale of at least a simple majority of the 
company’s shares to private investors. Certainly, the perception of the 
inefficiencies of public enterprise has lent some support to the idea that 
privatisation may provide a more efficient alternative. On the other hand 
given that, in the major cases,24 the policy implies the replacement of public 
by private monopoly, there is clearly a need to address the issue of whether 
the political goals are likely to be achieved at a cost in terms of loss of 
economic efficiency.25 
In this paper I take the view that privatisation essentially represents a 
change in structure of the agency model, and so how is this change to be 
‘?his acceptance of course stems from the information asymmetry. 
‘%olution of the agency problem requires that the enterprise acrrrnlly be allocated the pair 
(kO(e). no(@). 
z%c ptivatisation of the major utilities such as telecommunications, gas, airports, and the 
projected privatisation of electricity and water supply. 
*‘Supporters of privatisation argue of course that there will be no economic costs, only 
benefits. For a general discussion of the arguments on either side see Rees (1986b). 
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specified? I would argue that in the short run, there will be no change in the 
enterprise utility function - after all, the identities of the members of the 
coalition remain unchanged, while there is no reason in general to expect a 
reduction in trade union bargaining strength. Likewise, the market and 
technological constraints are not changed by privatisation as such. The 
identity of the ‘principal’ now changes to that of the regulatory agencyz6 
though, again, if we are interested in the analysis of enterprise inefficiency, we 
can take the principal’s utility function to remain unchanged.” The initial 
impact of privatisation must therefore result from changes in the control 
constraints, which in turn reflect changes in the underlying processes of 
planning, supervision and control. 
First, the profit and capital constraints that existed under (full) public 
ownership disappear, and are replaced by a much tighter stock market- 
determined profit constraint. The enterprise will now have free access to the 
capital market, but its investment planning process will have to be profit 
consistent - persistent appraisal optimism of the sort that characterises 
public enterprise would be severely punished by the stock market share 
valuation mechanism. However, these impact effects of privatisation are not 
necessarily welfare-improving. *’ As the profit constraint tightens, both 
management and workers have to give up utility, to an extent determined by 
relative bargaining strengths in the coalition. That is, slack in the form of 
excessive mployment and wage rates is reduced, but prices rise and outputs 
fall, the former increasing welfare,” the latter reducing it. 
Enter the regulatory process. In implicit recognition of the mixed effects of 
privatisation, regulatory frameworks have been established for each of the 
major privatised enterprises, the main feature of which for present purposes I 
take to be the rule constraining the permissible rate of price increase,3o the 
so-called ‘RPI -x’ rule. If this is binding, and the evidence suggests that it 
has been,” then in effect this increases the pressure on slack exerted by the 
tightening profit constraint and increases the probability that privatisation 
will indeed be welfare improving. 
This then raises the question: how was the regulatory constraint on the 
‘bAgain. this begs a number of questions, since government continues to have an interest in 
the activities of the enterprise and shareholders could also be regarded as in some sense 
‘principals’. 
*‘Indeed. to assume concern only with allocative efficiency may involve smaller loss of realism 
in the case of the regulatory agency than it does in the case of government. 
‘*In the sense that they increase the value of a partial equilibrium welfare measure, the sum of 
producers’ and consumers’ surpluses. 
29A g ain in the sense of the usual partial equilibrium welfare measure. 
“First proposed in Littlechild (1983). The precise form of the rule varies across enterprises. 
This detail is ignored here. 
“Thus, British Telecom has in each year since privatisation except the current one increased 
its prices by the full amount permitted under the rule. This year however it has not, possibly 
because of the threat of competition from an alternative supplier, Mercury, but more probably 
as a public relations exercise given the very bad press it has received on the quality of its 
services. 
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rate of price increase determined? The factual answer is: probably rather 
arbitrarily. 32 A number of considerations will have been balanced: the 
possible scope for productivity improvement, recent trends in costs, the likely 
effect on the stock market valuation of the shares to be issued at privatisa- 
tion, the political advantages of not appearing to be ‘soft’ on monopoly, 
and so on. The more relevant question is: when, after the five year period for 
which they are initially set has elapsed, the price constraint is reconsidered, 
how should33 it be chosen? We can now consider an agency model of the 
regulatory process which may provide an answer to this question. 
4. Regulation as agency 
The idea of modelling regulation as an agency problem is of course not 
new 34 but what matters is that the model should capture the essential 
features of the real situation. Because of space limitations, I set out here a 
very simple model which nonetheless captures the essential results of the 
more general analysis in Rees (1987b). Suppose we have a regulated 
monopoly which maximizes profitJs under conditions of increasing average 
cost, with a cost function C(y, 0), C,<O, with y as output and 8 again a 
productivity parameter. The regulator, who sets a maximum price p, knows 
the demand function y(p) but has only a prior density function on 0, which 
however is fully known by the monopoly. If the regulator sets p(@ according 
to the rule p = C,,(y, @ following a report i? from the monopoly, then this is 
not incentive compatib1e,36 since the monopoly will report a fl which implies 
that p(@ maximises his profit given the true 8. I would argue that this is the 
case under the current regulatory system in the U.K. The information on 
which a price constraint” will be based will be supplied by the enterprise -
there is necessarily an information asymmetry. 
Thus, the regulatory process as it stands, just as much as its predecessor, 
does not solve the ‘agency problem’. To solve this problem we need an 
additional instrument with which to ‘bribe’ the enterprise to reveal its true 8, 
and in the present case an obvious instrument3’ is a levy on pure prol3s,3g 
‘*For example, British T&corn’s rule is RPI-3%. Thrtc is a very cultural number. 
“Notice the analysis here will be unashamedly normative. 
‘*See in particular Baron and Mycrson (1982). 
3sFor simplicity I am ignoring the more complicated utility function for the enterprise 
discussed earlier. Similar results can however be obtained for this case. 
16As Baron and Mycrson, op. cit., show. 
“Since I am dealing here with a static model, it is helpful to translate a constraint on the rate 
of change of price to one on the level, which of course can be done given the initial price level. 
38Baron and Myerson used as an instrument a money transfer made by government to the 
monopoly. The idea of the government making transfers to highly prolltable enterprises uch as 
British Telecom and British Gas is not really credible. In other words the details of the 
regulatory situation in the U.K. do not fit the Baron-Myerson model and a somewhat different 
approach is called for. 
3shus the opportunity cost of shareholders’ funds is included in the cost of capital. We are 
nor interested in ‘rate of return regulation’. 
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TZO. A simple diagram can be used to show that under certain quite 
reasonable assumptions the regulator can in fact achieve a first-best solution. 
Thus suppose that 0 has two possible values, Bi, i= 1, 2, the enterprise 
reports one of these values 8i to the regulator who then sets a maximum 
price pip, and also sets a profit levy ‘I= T(Bi), subject to the no- 
bankruptcy constraint 
so that the enterprise can at least meet all its opportunity costs. In fig. la, we 
see the range of possible prices for 0=8,, bounded by pi, the monopoly 
price, and & =C(y,0,)/y, the minimum price the regulator can set and still 
expect output4* y> 0. If 8i were the true value he would set pf = C,.(y, 0,). In 
lb of the figure, 0: gives the locus of (tit?,), T(8,)) pairs which satisfy the 
no-bankruptcy constraint as an equality. 0: shows the equivalent locus for 
0=8,. If the regulator knew ei, he could set the corresponding p: and any 
profit levy in the interval [0, T:]. If he does not know Be given the 
assumptions on which the figure is drawn, he can still achieve the first best 
by offering to set (pf, T:) if 0i is reported, and (pf, 7;) if 8, is reported. This 
induces reporting of the true Bi, and permits marginal cost pricing. To 
see this, note that if 8i is true, the enterprise strictly prefers (pf, Tt) to 
P 
Pl 
P2 
PI - 
P2 - 
5 
T2 P) 
1 
Y 
Fig. la 
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Fig. lb 
4”Thus, given any price p” set by the regulator, the profit maximizing enterprise chooses 
output y” such that p”=C,(yoB), if 0 is the true state. For pO<p:, this implies that in 0, output 
will fall short of demand. 
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(pf, T2) and so will report O1. If 8, is true, the enterprise is indifferent 
between (pf, 5;) and (~7, T:) (given the ‘single crossing condition* stated 
below) and so will report Oz. In effect the regulator bribes the enterprise to 
reveal itself as having lower costs, when this is true, by allowing it positive 
profit. Since he is indifferent to the profit of the monopolist, this achieves the 
first best. The condition which guarantees this result is the ‘single crossing 
condition’, that 8, (the locus of (p, T) pairs satisfying x(p, O,)- T= ?“) cuts 
O(: from be10w.~’ 
The main policy implication I would draw from this analysis is that the 
regulatory framework so far constructed for privatised monopolies in the 
U.K. is seriously incomplete, since it encourages manipulation and false 
reporting by the enterprises concerned. If it is extended to include lump sum 
taxation on pure rents, then the first best42 may be available. 
5. Conclusion 
This attempt to analyse the inefficiency of public enterprises and the 
potential inefliciency of their privatised, regulated counterparts leaves a 
number of issues for further analysis. In particular, the enterprise utility 
function is something of a ‘black box’, and more analysis of the nature of the 
intra-firm bargaining equilibrium is required. A great deal of insight of a 
positive rather than normative kind could also be gained by replacing the 
assumption that the principal is interested only in allocative efficiency with a 
more realistic characterization of the objective function. My hope is however 
that enough will have been done to convince economists working on 
problems of public enterprise, privatisation and regulation that an approach 
through agency theory is a potentially fruitful one. 
4’11 can be shown that this condition requires only that marginal cost be decreasing in 0, 
which is a reasonable condition to impose on the problem. 
“If the regulator is not indiNerent lo the value of T, then in general the first-best (in terms of 
his preferences) is not available. 
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